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The term “comparison” in the context of Public Administration Science refers to an activity of aligning, analyzing, and identifying similarities and differences between various phenomena or objects under study. Meanwhile, administration is understood as a social phenomenon in which groups of people or citizens work together in an organized and purposeful manner to achieve certain collective goals.This research, entitled “A Comparative Study of Public Administration in Indonesia and South Korea in Achieving Effective and Accountable Governance,” aims to analyze both the similarities and differences between the two countries in terms of bureaucratic structure, public administration systems, and the effectiveness and accountability of governance. Indonesia and South Korea, as Asian nations with distinct historical backgrounds, governmental systems, and development trajectories, share a common vision of establishing a clean, transparent, and responsive system of governance.The study employs a qualitative descriptive approach using the literature review method, by examining various relevant academic and official sources. The main focus of the comparison lies in the bureaucratic and administrative systems of Indonesia and South Korea. The analysis also takes into account cultural characteristics and governmental structures, including the presidential system, legal framework, financial administration, and local government mechanisms.The findings of this research are expected to provide a comprehensive understanding of how differences in administrative structures and bureaucratic performance in both countries influence the effectiveness and accountability of their governments. Furthermore, the study aims to offer valuable insights for Indonesia in strengthening good governance and improving the quality of public service delivery.

This research aims to analyze Indonesia's presidential system of government through mechanisms of popular control over the president. In a presidential system of government, the president holds full executive power, separate from the legislative and judicial branches. This power must be balanced with strong control mechanisms to prevent abuse of power. One important form of oversight that often receives insufficient attention is direct popular control over the president. The method employed in this research is a juridical-normative method with statutory and conceptual approaches, supported by primary and secondary legal sources, with legal materials collected through literature study. The findings of this research indicate that mechanisms of popular control over the president remain weak, both through legal and political instruments. The impeachment mechanism stipulated in Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is extremely complex. Meanwhile, the oversight function of the House of Representatives (DPR) as the people's representative also does not operate optimally due to the dominance of oversized coalitions, which cause parliament to tend to favor the government. Strengthening popular control functions is not intended to weaken presidential power, but rather to ensure that executive power operates in an accountable and transparent manner while remaining subject to the principle of popular sovereignty, so that Indonesia's presidential system becomes more democratic and enjoys strong legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

This research examines the design of simultaneous elections in Indonesia as its main research object, a crucial discourse spurred by the persistent inefficiencies of a separated election model that produced divided governments. The discourse is marked by the shifting jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (MK). The primary problem addressed is the Court’s jurisprudential inconsistency, which creates significant legal uncertainty for election organizers and political actors. Therefore, the objective of this research is to critically analyze the evolution of the Court's rulings on this matter and their impact on its shifting role into a positive legislator. This study employs a normative-juridical method, focusing on the doctrinal analysis of primary legal materials, particularly the series of relevant Constitutional Court rulings. The analysis reveals an inconsistent jurisprudential journey, starting from an activist stance that imposed a five-ballot simultaneous model through Ruling 14/PUU-XI/2013, with the aim of strengthening the presidential system. Then, in response to the systemic chaos and humanitarian costs of the 2019 election, the Court retreated to an "open legal policy" doctrine in Ruling 55/PUU-XVII/2019, exhibiting judicial self-restraint by deferring the choice of an alternative model to the legislature. Finally, it abandoned this position in a final interventionist decision, Decicion 135/PUU-XXII/2024, which stipulated a specific model separating national and regional elections. The main finding confirms that this latest ruling positions the MK as a positive legislator, significantly overstepping its traditional judicial authority. It is concluded that although the final ruling substantively produces a more rational election design, its inconsistent formation process has fundamentally undermined the principles of legal certainty and the balance of powers, thereby creating a problematic precedent for the future of Indonesia's constitutional governance.

This study examines the constitutional position of the President and Vice President in Indonesia following the four amendments to the 1945 Constitution between 1999 and 2002, focusing on how these reforms reshaped executive authority and accountability. It addresses the problem of excessive presidential dominance and unclear vice-presidential functions under the New Order regime, with research objectives to analyze the institutional, authority, accountability, and relational dimensions of the amended constitutional framework. Employing a normative doctrinal method through statute and conceptual approaches, the study analyzes primary legal texts, scholarly articles, and tertiary materials using descriptive-analytical techniques. The main findings reveal that the introduction of direct joint elections, strict two-term limits, impeachment mechanisms, and the establishment of the Constitutional Court significantly strengthened checks and balances, clarified the Vice President’s supportive and succession roles, and redistributed legislative powers to the DPR. These reforms created a more balanced separation of powers and enhanced democratic legitimacy while also highlighting emerging challenges in institutional capture and democratic backsliding. In conclusion, Indonesia’s gradualist constitutional reform successfully transformed an authoritarian executive into a more accountable presidential system, though ongoing vigilance and potential further amendments are necessary to consolidate democratic gains.

The selection of the head of government is a fundamental aspect of the constitutional system that reflects the political and legal character of a state. Although Indonesia and Malaysia share similar historical roots, they adopt significantly different systems of governance. This study addresses two core issues which are about the structure and mechanism of executive and legislative power, and the impact of the presidential threshold and parliamentary coalition on governmental stability. Using a normative juridical method with statutory and comparative approaches, the findings reveal that Indonesia, under a presidential system, applies a nomination threshold to ensure political stability, yet it may restrict political access. Meanwhile, Malaysia’s parliamentary system is more flexible but vulnerable to instability due to coalition dynamics. This study recommends a reassessment of Indonesia’s presidential threshold for a more democratic process and strengthening of political stability mechanisms in Malaysia.

This research analyzes the Constitutional Court Decision Number 62/PPU-XXII/2024 regarding the constitutionality of the presidential threshold and its implications for the development of inclusive democracy in Indonesia. Using a juridical-normative and conceptual approach, this study examines the presidential threshold provisions as regulated in Article 222 of Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections from the perspective of inclusive democracy theory and electoral systems. The results show that the Constitutional Court affirmed the constitutionality of the presidential threshold as an open legal policy of the legislators, while also noting that lawmakers should reconsider the threshold percentage in future revisions of the Election Law. This research identifies a tension between two equally important democratic values: government effectiveness and political representation. On one hand, the presidential threshold can strengthen the presidential system by encouraging political party consolidation and creating more stable governance. On the other hand, this provision potentially limits political inclusivity by reducing the diversity of choices for voters and restricting opportunities for small or new political parties to nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates independently. This study concludes that to realize a more inclusive democracy following the Constitutional Court Decision, further efforts are needed to reform the electoral system, strengthen political parties, enhance political education, and develop innovations in political participation.

Constitutional amendments are crucial instruments in the dynamics of state governance, particularly in democratic countries that adopt either a presidential or parliamentary system. This study aims to analyze and compare the mechanisms, implications, and challenges of the constitutional amendment process in both systems. Using a descriptive-comparative approach, the research examines how each system designs and implements constitutional changes, including the role of the legislative and executive branches, as well as public participation. The findings indicate that the presidential system tends to have a more rigid amendment procedure compared to the parliamentary system, which is more flexible in enacting constitutional changes. These differences have implications for government stability, decision-making effectiveness, and the balance of power within each system. Therefore, a deep understanding of constitutional amendment mechanisms in different governmental systems is essential to ensure that constitutional changes remain aligned with democratic principles and national interests.

Opposition is an important element in a democratic system that functions as a mechanism of control over power. In the context of Indonesian constitutionality, the existence of the opposition is a prerequisite for the realization of a healthy and effective democracy. However, in practice, the term opposition is often equated with the principle of checks and balances, thus causing a blur of meaning between the two. This paper aims to examine the paradigm of the opposition in the Pancasila democratic system and analyze the relationship between the opposition and the principle of checks and balances in the Indonesian constitutional system. This research uses a qualitative method with a normative juridical approach, through a conceptual approach and a legislative approach. An analysis was carried out on the doctrines of constitutional law and provisions in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia related to the implementation of opposition and the principle of checks and balances. This approach was chosen to explore legal issues in depth and find a comprehensive understanding of the role of the opposition in the Indonesian constitutional system. The results of the study show that even though Indonesia does not adhere to a parliamentary or presidential system with two parties, the implementation of the opposition is still relevant and carried out with attention to the values of consensus in Pancasila democracy. The opposition in Indonesia is not confrontational, but constructive and oriented towards strengthening the system of supervision of power. Opposition and the principle of checks and balances are two concepts that are terminologically different, but interrelated and inseparable in Indonesian constitutional practice. Both serve as important instruments in maintaining the balance of power and ensuring accountability in the administration of government. Thus, a proper understanding of the opposition paradigm and the principle of checks and balances is the key to strengthening constitutional democracy in Indonesia.

Elections are a fundamental element of democratic systems, granting citizens te political right to vote and be elected. This study aims to compare the implementation of citizens’ political right in elections under presidential and parliamentary democracy systems. The research method used is normative/doctrinal/library research. This study analyzes the differences in the exercise of political rights in both systems and their impact on the quality of democracy and citizen participation. The findings indicate that the presidential system allows voters to directly elect the head of state, providing strong legitimacy but posing a risk of political deadlock. In contrast, the parliamentary system emphasizes the election of parliament members, who then determine the head of government, offering flexibility but potentially leading to political instability. This study concludes that both systems have advantages and challenges in ensuring citizens’ political rights. Therefore, mechanisms should be developed to enhance political participation and ensure more democratic and inclusive elections.  

This research examines the constitutional aspects of executive power limitations in presidential systems by comparing governmental practices in Indonesia and the United States. Through juridical-normative and comparative approaches, this research analyzes constitutional design, jurisprudence, and institutional practices that limit presidential power in both countries. Key findings indicate significant differences in checks and balances mechanisms, with the United States relying on a stricter doctrine of separation of powers compared to Indonesia, which implements power distribution. This research also identifies weaknesses in executive power limitations in Indonesia, particularly concerning legislative authority and the appointment of high-ranking state officials. The results of this research are expected to contribute to strengthening constitutional mechanisms in limiting executive power to prevent abuse of authority.

The discourse regarding political determination in the process of impeaching the president and/or vice president is very interesting and deserves to be taken seriously.  The author's hypothesis states that the process of impeaching the president and/or vice president is a political forum where at any time the MK has decided that the DPR's allegation that the President has committed a violation of the constitution is true, but to fully execute it will return to the MPR.  This article tests this hypothesis using the normative juridical method, which involves analyzing legal norms, principles and doctrines through a positive legal approach.  This study concludes that although the main characteristic of impeaching the president and/or vice president in a presidential system is a difficult clause, the choice to prioritize the legitimacy of the political forum must also be followed by a rational process and composition.

The Constitutional Court (MK) regarding the Election Law on the presidential and vice presidential nomination threshold. Since the presidential election was held directly, the issue of the threshold for nominating presidential and vice presidential candidates has always surfaced every time a presidential election is held. In 2004, for example, the presidential nomination threshold was 10 percent. This research is a juridical-normative research, namely a process to find legal rules, legal principles, and legal doctrines in order to answer the legal issues faced. The data was analyzed descriptively-qualitatively.The results of this study indicate that the Constitutional Court Decision Number 74/PUU-XVII/2020 concerning the presidential nomination threshold (Presidential Threshold) is one of the important decisions in the discourse of democracy in Indonesia. The following is an explanation of the Ratio Decidendi of the decision in relation to the concept of democracy: Constitutionality of the Presidential Threshold The Constitutional Court (MK) in its decision emphasized that the presidential threshold or presidential nomination threshold is constitutional. This means that the provisions regarding the threshold do not conflict with the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the presidential threshold is an open legal policy (Open Legal Policy) which is the authority of the lawmakers, namely the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President. The purpose of the Presidential Threshold, the Constitutional Court explained that the purpose of the presidential threshold is to simplify the party system and the presidential system, as well as to create government stability. The Ratio Decidendi of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 74/Puu-XXII/2024, Number 87/Puu-XXII/2024, Number 129/Puu-XXI/2023, Number 131/Puu-XXI 2023 concerning the Presidential Nomination Threshold is the Presidential Threshold is constitutional and does not conflict with the principles of democracy.