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Psychopathic disorders are often reduced to medical issues related to structural brain abnormalities or genetic predisposition, while the contribution of the social environment to their development is often overlooked. This article aims to evaluate claims of genetic determinism in neurocriminology and analyze the role of environmental deprivation as a factor shaping the nervous system relevant to psychopathy. The research method used is qualitative research with a conceptual approach. The results indicate that claims of genetic determinism lack sufficient explanatory power when separated from environmental dynamics. Findings regarding the MAOA-L gene and abnormalities in the amygdala or prefrontal cortex are indeed correlated with antisocial tendencies, but this relationship is contingent and nonlinear. Psychopathy, in this configuration, is the result of the interaction between neurobiological systems and cumulative social experiences. Therefore, an interactional model is needed not only to conceptually understand the etiology of psychopathy but also as a basis for formulating more accurate and ethical forensic assessments, rehabilitation policies, and criminal interventions.

Criminal liability in modern law is built on the assumption that every individual is a rational and autonomous moral agent. However, neuroscientific evidence suggests that structural disruption of the amygdala and prefrontal cortex significantly impairs the capacity to judge actions ethically. This study aims to analyze the influence of neurological disorders on an individual's moral capacity and to formulate legal parameters for assessing criminal liability based on actual capacity. The research method employed normative legal research with a conceptual approach. The results indicate that perpetrators with dysfunction in the amygdala-PFC circuit experience a degradation of moral capacity that weakens the basis for the formation of mens rea in a substantive sense and falls outside the reach of legal systems that still rely on a model of responsibility based on the assumption of universal free will. The criminal legal system, in its current form, lacks a precise evaluative mechanism to distinguish between perpetrators with impaired moral control and those acting deliberatively. In this situation, the construction of criminal liability cannot be standardized, and reformulation of evaluation instruments is necessary to avoid sentencing bias against individuals with structural impairments in ethical capacity.