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The president's prerogative is a form of power inherent in the president's position as head of state. One form of this prerogative is the granting of abolition, which is the abolition of legal proceedings against a person or group of people who are or will undergo judicial proceedings. However, in its implementation, the president's authority to grant abolition is not absolute, but is limited by the applicable legal provisions and constitutional mechanisms. This study aims to analyze the limits of the president's power in exercising the prerogative in the form of abolition and review the juridical aspects that govern the procedure and its considerations. The research method used is normative juridical research with a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. Data sources are obtained from relevant laws and regulations, legal literature, and scientific works. The results of the study show that the president's authority in granting abolition is regulated in Article 14 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which requires the president to pay attention to the considerations of the House of Representatives (DPR). Thus, this authority is not an absolute prerogative, but is limited by the principle of checks and balances in the Indonesian constitutional system. The conclusion of this study emphasizes that the restriction is a form of constitutional supervision over the use of presidential power to remain in line with the principles of the rule of law and constitutional democracy

Corruption cases in Indonesia often involve the recovery of state assets, including properties encumbered by mortgages (hak tanggungan). This research conducts a normative legal analysis on how current law treats such pledged assets when they become objects of state confiscation in corruption crimes. We examine Indonesian legislation (especially the Tipikor Act, TPPU Act, and Mortgage Act), judicial practice, and principles of justice and legal certainty. The Bank Perumda BPR Purworejo case is used as an illustrative case study: here fictitious loans and misused collateral led to state losses of hundreds of millions of rupiah, and investigators seized assets (including four mortgaged properties) as evidence. The analysis finds that existing rules inadequately protect good-faith creditors: courts have noted that a corruption verdict does not automatically erase a prior mortgage lien, and that a certified mortgage confers a preferential right equal to a judgment. In practice, however, law enforcement often seizes all assets of the convict without first verifying third-party rights, creating legal uncertainty and perceived injustice. We argue that fair outcomes require stricter safeguards for creditors (e.g. mandatory review of collateral status before seizure) and consideration of equitable principles. In conclusion, we recommend legal reforms or guidelines to balance the state’s recovery goals with protection of bona fide mortgagees, so as to uphold substantive justice while maintaining legal certainty.

This study aims to analyze the regulation and implementation of the authority to test laws and regulations (judicial review) in the Indonesian state system based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This study applies a normative juridical method using three main approaches, namely the statute approach, the conceptual approach, and the historical approach. The legal data collected includes primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials, which are then reviewed through qualitative analysis. The results of the study show that normatively the division of judicial review authority between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court has been expressly regulated in Article 24A paragraph (1) and Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The Supreme Court is given the authority to test regulations under the law against the law, and the Constitutional Court is given the authority to test laws against the 1945 Constitution. This division of authority is a manifestation of the principle of separation of powers and the mechanism of checks and balances after the third amendment to the 1945 Constitution. However, in practice, this two-roof judicial review system tends to give rise to conceptual and practical problems, such as overlapping authority and differences in decisions between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court which have the potential to create legal uncertainty and reduce public trust in the judicial institution. Therefore, it is necessary to reorganize the authority of judicial review by strengthening coordination between institutions or unifying the authority of judicial review which is centered on one institution only in order to guarantee legal certainty, harmonization of norms, and supremacy of the constitution in the Indonesian state system.